Discuss the role of Fast Track Special Courts in ensuring speedy justice for victims of sexual offences. What administrative and infrastructural bottlenecks hinder their full operationalisation?

Q. Discuss the role of Fast Track Special Courts in ensuring speedy justice for victims of sexual offences. What administrative and infrastructural bottlenecks hinder their full operationalisation? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Launched in October 2019 as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme following the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and the Supreme Court's Suo Motu Writ (Criminal) No. 1/2019, Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) — including exclusive POCSO (e-POCSO) courts — were designed to end the long delays that defeat justice in rape and child sexual abuse cases [1][3]. Their record is substantial, but operationalisation remains incomplete.

Role in ensuring speedy justice - Dedicated adjudication capacity: 775 FTSCs, including 398 e-POCSO courts, are functional in 29 States/UTs (as on 30.04.2026), insulating sexual-offence trials from the general docket [1]. - Backlog reduction: cumulative disposal crossed 3.3 lakh cases since inception, with a disposal rate of over 96% — a decisive dent in pendency [4]. - Victim-centric process: e-POCSO courts and Vulnerable Witness Deposition Centres create child-friendly settings that reduce secondary victimisation during deposition [4]. - Assured financing: the Central share flows from the Nirbhaya Fund, insulating the scheme from annual budgetary uncertainty [2][3].

Administrative and infrastructural bottlenecks - Shortfall against target: 775 courts function against the revised target of 790, itself scaled down from the original 1,023 [1][2]. - Federal coordination gaps: as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme requiring State share (₹744.99 crore of the ₹1,952.23 crore outlay) and High Court concurrence, uneven State uptake leaves some UTs outside the network [2]. - Continuity uncertainty: repeated short extensions — the latest only up to 30 September 2026 — deter States from long-term judicial recruitment and infrastructure commitments [1]. - Ecosystem deficits: shortage of judicial officers, support staff, forensic capacity and public prosecutors slows trials even where courts exist [1].

FTSCs demonstrate that targeted institutional design can convert the constitutional promise of speedy trial under Article 21 into measurable outcomes. Placing the scheme on a stable, multi-year footing, with States assured of funding and complementary investment in prosecutors, forensics and witness protection, would let this model deliver justice that is both swift and dignified.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs), PIB (23 July 2026) — launch year, 775 FTSCs/398 e-POCSO in 29 States/UTs as on 30.04.2026, 790 target, extension to 30.09.2026, staffing and capacity gaps 2. Cabinet approves continuation of Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Fast Track Special Courts for further three years, PIB (28 Nov 2023) — ₹1,952.23 crore outlay, ₹1,207.24 crore Central / ₹744.99 crore State share, Nirbhaya Fund financing, original 1,023 target 3. Scheme of Fast Track Special Courts, PIB — legal basis in Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and SC Suo Motu Writ (Criminal) No. 1/2019; Nirbhaya Fund 4. Swift Justice, Safer Society: The Impact of Fast Track Special Courts, PIB — cumulative disposal, 96%+ disposal rate, Vulnerable Witness Deposition Centres