The repeated 'temporary extension' of centrally sponsored justice-delivery schemes reflects deeper federal coordination challenges. Critically analyse in the context of FTSCs.

Q. The repeated 'temporary extension' of centrally sponsored justice-delivery schemes reflects deeper federal coordination challenges. Critically analyse in the context of FTSCs. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Fast Track Special Courts (FTSC) Scheme, launched in October 2019 under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and the Supreme Court's order in Suo Motu Writ (Criminal) No. 1/2019, has been extended thrice — the latest a stopgap till 30 September 2026 [1]. This pattern is partly, though not wholly, a symptom of Centre-State coordination deficits.

Extensions do expose federal coordination gaps - Split responsibility: the Centre funds salaries of one judicial officer and seven staff per court on a 60:40 / 90:10 pattern from the Nirbhaya Fund, but premises, posts and judicial officers depend on States and High Courts — no single accountable authority [1]. - Persistent target shortfall: the original 1,023-court target was revised down to 790; only 775 FTSCs (398 e-POCSO) were functional by 30.04.2026, and in 29 of 36 States/UTs [1][2]. - Reversible participation: from 761 FTSCs in 30 States/UTs (2023) the count fell to 725 in 29 States/UTs by June 2025 — contraction, not steady rollout, reflecting State fiscal and manpower stress [2][3]. - Short sanction horizons discourage States from creating permanent posts, so capacity is rebuilt each cycle.

But the diagnosis is only partly federal - Bottlenecks also lie in subordinate-judiciary vacancies, shortage of public prosecutors and forensic delays — beyond Centre-State bargaining. - Extensions equally reflect appraisal discipline: the Cabinet renewed the Scheme for 2023-26 with a ₹1,952.23 crore outlay after review [2], and performance is strong — 3,34,213 cases disposed since inception [3] with a disposal rate of about 96% [4].

Thus the recurring extensions signal a design flaw in cooperative implementation rather than a failure of intent. Multi-year committed funding, MoU-based State commitments framed with High Courts, and outcome-linked fund releases converged with judicial infrastructure schemes would stabilise the network — giving durable effect to the Supreme Court's mandate and to the Article 21 guarantee of a speedy trial.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs), PIB, 23 July 2026 — extension to 30.09.2026; 775 FTSCs incl. 398 e-POCSO in 29 States/UTs; 60:40 & 90:10 CSS pattern; one judicial officer + seven staff 2. Cabinet approves continuation of Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Fast Track Special Courts for further three years, PIB, 2023 — ₹1,952.23 crore outlay (₹1,207.24 crore Central share from Nirbhaya Fund); 761 FTSCs in 30 States/UTs 3. Scheme of Fast Track Special Courts, PIB — 725 FTSCs in 29 States/UTs as on 30.06.2025; 3,34,213 cases disposed; revised target of 790 courts 4. Swift Justice, Safer Society: The Impact of Fast Track Special Courts, PIB — disposal rate of 96.28%